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Nexus between Intelligence Education and Intelligence
Training: A South African Perspective
Abstract
This paper examines the nexus of intelligence education and training from a South African
perspective with the focus on current practices in light of the country’s transition towards
democracy. A brief overview is provided on the history and development of the South
African intelligence community with specific focus on the civilian intelligence services from
the period prior 1994 to date (2015). The main focus, however, is on intelligence education
that is currently available from training institutions and universities in South Africa as
registered with the Department of Higher Education as well as private training institutions
on the one hand, and the intelligence training practices within the statutory intelligence
environment on the other. To this extent, the relations between academic institutions and
the intelligence structures in terms of education and training within South Africa are
perused against other practices within the African continent and internationally. The
approaches to the study of intelligence are also addressed within this paper.
Likewise, the how, what as well as to whom – pertaining to intelligence education and
training availability and accessibility to students and practitioners within South Africa, is
reviewed and analysed with the focus on making recommendations for the enhancement
and improvement thereof to enable a focus on preparing the next generation of
professional intelligence officers.
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Introduction
Intelligence is not just any government activity – along with other security functions
– it has a “peculiarly intimate relationship to political power.”1 Each state
furthermore practices intelligence in ways which are specific to that nation, which is
dictated by the type of political system, ideological outlook and culture that
formulate its views on national threats against which the intelligence regime is
implemented. Similarly, it bears the fruits of or scars inflicted by previous regimes –
be it a democracy or non-democratic regime. This would also impact on the form and
type of intelligence training and/or education in a specific country. South Africa is in
this regard not an exception to the rule and the history and development of its
intelligence also contributes to current intelligence training and education practices.
It is therefore required to provide a brief reflection of the history and development of
intelligence in South Africa2 which would also serve as additional background to the
current situation.
An Overview of the History and Development of Intelligence in South
Africa
Very few publications exist on South African intelligence services and, according to
this research, almost none covering the history and development thereof.
Nonetheless, intelligence remains an area of interest not only for scholars and
academics, but also its practitioners – although it is commonly claimed that the
latter, by their nature, resist theory. The development of intelligence is linked to the
following five time periods of historic and political significance, namely: Early
developments and the Zuid Afrikaansche Republic - ZAR (1652 to 1910), the Union of
South Africa (1910 to 1961), the Republic of South Africa (1961 to 1978), the
securitisation of South Africa (1978 to 1995), pre and post negotiations in South
Africa ( 1995 to 2009) and lastly the period 2009 to 2014 that is reflective of the
newly established State Security Agency (SSA).
1652 – 1880: Early Intelligence Developments in South Africa
The present day civilian intelligence regime in South Africa reflects the evolution of
intelligence in the rest of the world and is also embedded in a strong history with the
development of military activities since its early colonial period. It was only with the
establishment of the Republic that South African intelligence came into its own and
developed into police, military and civilian structures. The origins of intelligence in
South Africa could be traced back to activities such as scouting against any possible
threats of hostile natives by soldiers at the garrison at Cape Castle in 1652 which was
Peter Gill,, “Knowing the Self, Knowing the Other: The Comparative Analysis of Security
Intelligence,” In Loch Johnson (ed), Handbook of Intelligence Studies (New York: Routledge, 2007):
82-90.
1

Based on research conducted within a master’s degree in Political Sciences completed in 2014 at the
North West University in South Africa by the author under the supervision of Professor Andre
Duvenhage. Matthias A. Van den Berg, The Intelligence Regime in South Africa 1994-2014; An
Analytical Perspective (Unpublished Magister Dissertation North West University, 2014): 1-174,
available at: dspace.nwu.ac.za/handle/10394/13438
2
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built by the Dutch under the auspices of Governor Jan van Riebeeck.3 Subsequent
European settlers were allotted farms by the colonial authorities in the regions
around Cape Town in the beginning of 1657 and by the early 1700’s, the colonialists
had begun to spread into the hinterland.4 From the 1770’s colonists also came into
contact and in conflict with Bantu-speaking chiefdoms and intermittent warfare
ensued. Scouts and messengers where employed by the colonialists as well as by the
Xhosa’s and Zulu’s (the latter had a professional corps or impi of spies) during this
time period to either protect their homesteads or help during skirmishes for land and
cattle.5
During the period between 1815 and about 1835, intelligence remained loosely
focused on the concept of scouting for the purpose of security and defence.
Meanwhile, as explained in the SA Yearbook,6 in the mid 1830’s, a large number of
the original colonialists, mainly referred to as Voortrekkers, felt a growing
dissatisfaction and alienation from the British imperialism, migrated north beyond
the borders of the Cape, in what became known as the Great Trek. The Voortrekkers
later established the Transvaal and Free State Republics adjacent to the British Natal
and Cape colonies. Albeit, more formalised intelligence activities, linked to military
actions, were to follow especially after the discovery of diamonds, with Britain
annexing the Kimberley area in 1876 and the Transvaal in 1877. This led to the First
Anglo-Boer War that lasted until British withdrawal in 1881. Intelligence was still
restricted to small-scale and mostly uncoordinated utilisation of scouts by both sides
of the war. This was to change with the discovery of the Witwatersrand goldfields in
1886, which signified the emergence of the modern South African industrial state.
With the need for deep-level mining and the resulting influx of English-speaking
immigrants or foreigners (known as “Uitlanders”) on the goldfields and their
accompanied political demands for equal rights, the political climate also changed
within the Zuid Afrikaansche Republic (ZAR).
Linked to this was the political aim of Cecil John Rhodes in the Cape Colony to
extend British imperialism from Cape to Cairo,7 against the background of the fact
that the British Empire was regarded as the “super-power” of the world during this
time period. In contrast to the claims by O’Brien8 that South Africa did not possess a
national intelligence service until its establishment as a republic in 1961, the changed
political situation and the looming threat of British imperialism, subsequently
impacted on the role of intelligence9 within the ZAR and led to the first
institutionalised intelligence in Southern Africa.
Saffer Wiki. South African Army Intelligence Corps History (2012), available at http:
//www.justdone.co.za/ and South African Defence Force Military Intelligence (Sentinel Project),
available at: http://www.sadf.sentinelprojects.com/mf/m:history
4 History. (South African Government Online. 2012) available at: http://www.info.gov.za
5 Jeff Peires, “Pre-Colonial and Anti-Colonial Intelligence Operations of Xhosa Kingdoms, (17001900), Unpublished Manuscript (2007), available at: http://www.intelhistoryXhosa
6 South Africa. South African Yearbook, 2011/12. (Pretoria: South African Government Information,
2012), available at: http://www.info.gov.za
7 Hendrik Kamffer, Om Een Scherpe Oog In’t Zeil Te Houden: Die Geheime Diens in Die Zuid
Afrikaansche Republiek, (Potchefstroom University for CHE, Thesis Phd Unpublished, 1999): 71-71,
available at: dspace.nwu.ac.za/handle/10394/3141
8 O’Brien, Kevin A. The South African Intelligence Services: From Apartheid to Democracy, 19482005 (London: Routledge, 2011): 13.
9 Kent defines intelligence in three distinctive contexts namely; a kind of knowledge, a type of
organisation and the activity pursued by the organisation. Godson also adds that intelligence is at
3
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1880 – 1910: The ZAR Geheime Dienst
The main purpose of the ZAR Secret Service was to obtain information on the
activities and sentiments of foreigners working in the Witwatersrand area, as well as
weapon shipments for their support in an attempt to overthrow the Kruger regime;
obviously with the support of Britain through Rhodes’s assistance. The formation of
the ZAR Geheime Dienst or Secret Service is commonly attributed to the then State
Secretary of the ZAR, Dr. W. J. Leyds. However, the person who took the first actions
in the inauguration of a secret service was advocate Ewald Esselen who, as newly
appointed State Attorney (May 1894), appointed two members during June and July
1894 as agents to investigate anti-ZAR sentiments.10 The agents were placed within
the detective branch of the then police service and within this unit the secret service
saw its beginnings and its official inauguration on 30 December 1895.11 However, the
political climate changed towards the end of 1899 with the determination of Sir
Alfred Milner, then British High Commissioner in South Africa, to establish British
rule throughout the continent which eventually forced the ZAR to declare war against
the British in October of that year – which was also the start of the Second Anglo
Boer War.
Nevertheless, during the initial stages of the war, the agents of the Secret Service
functioned beside scouts of the Boer Commando’s on the battle front. However, as
the war evolved, the Scout Corps and their specific focus on tactical military
intelligence became more relevant and resulted in the steady withdrawal of the
Secret Service agents from their headquarters in Pretoria. Another influential factor
was the collapse of state administration and the subsequent invasion of Pretoria in
June 1900 and as stated by Van den Bergh (1974): “After the fall of Pretoria … De
Geheime Dienst disappeared as a unit and, perhaps with poetic justice, died as it was
born, in obscurity.” The ZAR Secret Service is, however, the first statutory
intelligence service within South Africa – having its roots deeply established within
that of a police detective unit, similar to the origins of most intelligence services in
the rest of the world.
1910 – 1961: Intelligence in the Union of South Africa
With the end of the Second Anglo Boer War and the subsequent formation of the
Union of South Africa after the signing of a peace treaty in May 1902, civilian
intelligence remained on the backburner for some time and the presence of
institutionalised military intelligence dominated this function. This was also the case
in the rest of the world, especially due to both World War I and II. However, in the
once knowledge, organisation and process (or activity). This is also referred to by Shulsky and Schmitt
as making the full concept of intelligence much richer. Intelligence organisation refers to the structure
or intelligence community while intelligence activity is what they do and the intelligence information
(knowledge) is what they produce according to Herman. Godson, Roy, (ed) Intelligence
Requirements for the 1980’s. (Washington D.C.: National Strategic Information Center, 1983):5;
Herman, Michael, Intelligence: Power in Peace and War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996): 2; Kent, Sherman, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy.(London: Oxford
University Press,1953): ix; Shulsky, Abram N. & Schmitt, Gary J, Silent Warfare: Understanding the
World of Intelligence, 3rd edition, (Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2002): 1.
10 Van den Bergh, Gert N, “Secret Service in the South African Republic, 1895-1900,” Military
History Journal, (2), (December, 1974): 1.
11 Kamffer, Om Een Scherpe Oog In’t Zeil Te Houden, 52-55, 92.
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period just after the formation of the Union, the military forces present at that time
were combined into one structure - the Union Defence Force (UDF) under the newly
elected minister of Defence, General J.C. Smuts.12 For this reason,13 July 1912 has
come to be generally accepted as the birth date of the UDF. Interestingly, as the
Union was a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations from its
establishment in 1910 until 1961, it received its intelligence from British Intelligence
Services. Even the Union Defence Act of 1912, in terms of which the Union Defence
Force came into being, made no provision for its own intelligence service. However,
for most of this time period, South Africa, as a dominion of the British Empire,
received intelligence from them. On 1 November 1940, the SA Intelligence Section
was formally established as the SA Intelligence Corps which assisted the British
forces during World War II (WWII).14
The Special Branch of the South African Police was established in 1947, after a visit
by officials to Britain to study the Special Branch of Scotland Yard.15 Drawn from the
detective service of the South African Police, the Branch acted as an elite political
police. Africa16 explains that in its internal security function, the Special Branch was
engaged in tactical intelligence activity. The support from British intelligence services
to the Union collapsed after the independence declaration of the Republic of South
Africa and its subsequent withdrawal from the Commonwealth. With no foreign
intelligence support, the South African military leaders realised that the country
would have to provide its own intelligence requirements to a greater extent. Thus, as
described by Potgieter,17 the Division Military Intelligence (DMI) was established on
2 February 1961.
1961 – 1978: The Republican Intelligence and the Bureau for State Security
During the period from 1960 (the effective beginnings of both SA’s post-colonial
intelligence history and the violent struggle against apartheid) to the 1990’s (the
decade in which the transition to post-apartheid SA began), South Africa could be
perceived as a security state and was depicted as such most of the Cold War era. After
the creation of an independent military intelligence capacity within the South African
Defence Force (SADF), Genl. Van den Bergh was appointed as head of the Special
Branch in 1963 and established a unit named as Republic Intelligence (RI), which
was claimed to be responsible for effectively countering any internal political
resistance within South Africa.18 In this context, then Prime Minister B. J. Vorster
gave his Security Advisor Genl. Van den Bergh the instruction to set up a central

As acknowledged by the SADF Sentinel Project and Africa, Sandy E, (ed), Changing Intelligence
Dynamics in South Africa. (Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform. Cranfield, UK.:
Cranfield University,2009): 62-70 and Potgieter, H.J. Commission of Inquiry into Matters Relating
to the Security of the State of Pretoria, (Government Printer, 1970): 37-38.
13 As supported by Dorning, W.A. “A Concise History of the South African Defence Force (19121987),” Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies, 17(2) (1987):1-24.
14 It must however, be stated that the entire activity of the SA Intelligence Corp, was only of a
operational and tactical combat related nature and that strategic intelligence was still being supplied
by Britain. Potgieter, Commission of Inquiry, 7.
15 Ibid, 78.
16 Sandy E. Africa, Policy for Managing Access to Intelligence Information in Post-Apartheid South
Africa. (Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand, Unpublished Thesis PhD, 2006): 74.
17 Potgieter, Commision of Inquiry, 7-9 and SADF Sentinel Project..
18 O’Brien, The South African Intelligence Services, 24 and Potgieter, Commission of Inquiry 9.
12
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intelligence organisation in 1968.19 This saw the birth of the Bureau for State Security
(BOSS), which was officially formed in May 1969 with no executive powers. The
mandate of this department was to investigate matters affecting the security of the
state, to correlate and evaluate information collected and, where necessary, to inform
and advise government, interested government departments and other bodies.
Former members of the police and military were recruited into the Bureau, which
gave it a typical police agency character.20 Furthermore, the South African society
became increasingly militarised21 in the 1970’s and 1980’s with the era which
culminated in an action of a Total National Strategy by Government against the socalled “Onslaught” from communism.22 The Information Scandal in 1978 (where
covert funds were used to influence perceptions of South Africa overseas by
purchasing media outlets and publications) led to the end of Vorster’s premiership
and the rise of Defence Minister P. W. Botha to the leadership in 1978. Prime
Minister Botha appointed Kobie Coetsee (Deputy Minister of Defence and National
Security and later of National Intelligence) to head a Commission of Inquiry to
examine options to rationalise the intelligence functions and determine a future
course for the strategic intelligence brief.23 This brought the era of BOSS to an end
and opened a new era with the restructuring of the civilian intelligence regime.
1978 – 1995: National Intelligence Service
With the resignation of Genl. Van den Bergh as Head of BOSS, the name of the
Bureau of State Security was changed to that of the Department of National Security
(DONS) on the first of September 1978. Again on the first April 1979, DONS
underwent a name change to that of the National Intelligence Service (NIS)24 and the
subsequent appointment on 1 June 1980 of Dr Neil Barnard (a professor at the
University of Orange Free State) as Director-General.25 Obviously events in the
international arena also impacted on the developments within South Africa, such as
the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the
ultimate end of the Cold War Era. Similarly in response to the rising tide of
Potgieter, Commission of Inquiry, 12.
O’Brien, The South African Intelligence Services, 65.
21 Africa, Sandy E, The South African Intelligence Services: A Historical Perspective in Changing
Intelligence Dynamics, In Africa, S. & Kwadjo, J,(eds) Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector
Reform (GFN-SSR) / African Security Sector Network (ASSN), (Birmingham, UK.: Department of
International Development, 2009): 61-94.
22 O’Brien, The South African Intelligence Services, 50-51 ; O’Brien, Kevin A., Commissions of
Inquiry in South Africa’s Intelligence History 1960-2005 in Farson, A.Stuart & Phythian, Mark, (eds.)
Commissions of Inquiry and National Security: Comparative Approaches (ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2011):
221-249; Frankel, Phillip, H, Pretoria’s Praetorians: Civil-Military Relations in South Africa (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1984)
23 O’Brien, The South African Intelligence Services, 64.
24 NIS was mainly structured in Chief Directorates based on the following functions namely; Foreign
and Domestic Collection; Counterintelligence - Offensive counterespionage and defensive security
function; Technology – Chemical Section including deciphering, Photographic section and a Technical
Section for mechanical capabilities, an Interception of Communications Section that includes satellite
and HF, a Transcription and Translation Section, a Cryptography unit for decrypting, communication
and crypto-analysis, and a satellite communication interception capability; a Research and Analysis
Chief Directorate responsible for intelligence products and a Corporate Resources structure for
Human Resource Management, Auditing, legal matters and Strategic Management Planning. South
Africa. National Intelligence Service, Public Report, 1969 to 1994: National Intelligence Services 25
Years. (Pretoria: National Intelligence Service (NIS), 1994): 19-34.
25 Ibid, 15 and O’Brien, The South African Intelligence Services, 66.
19

20
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resistance, the international community strengthened its support for the antiapartheid cause and sanctions and boycotts were instituted against South Africa,
both unilaterally by countries across the world and through the United Nations
(UN).26 In September 1989, FW de Klerk replaced PW Botha as State President
(following his stroke), and as stated by Africa,27 and announced at the opening of
Parliament in February 1990, the unbanning of the liberation movements (ANC, PAC
and SACP) and release of political prisoners, among them, Nelson Mandela. These
conditions, according to Africa,28 led to the return of leaders of the exiled ANC to the
country, which paved the way for negotiations. This was followed by the signing of
the Groote Schuur Minute in May 1990 by the ANC and Government.
This was also the beginning of a negotiated peace settlement – led by secret talks
from spies on both sides (ANC-DIS and NIS), that according to O’Brien29 and
Africa30 culminated in a new political dispensation that came after the Convention
for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) negotiations, the Transitional Executive
Council (TEC) and subsequently the Government of National Unity (GNU). After a
lengthy negotiation process, South Africa’s first democratic election was held on
April twenty-seventh, 1994, the date the new interim Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa came into effect. This Constitution gave South Africa nine new
provinces in place of the previous four provinces and 10 "homelands," and provided
for the GNU to be constituted by all parties.31 The NIS, however, remained the
intelligence service for the new South Africa until January 1995.
1995 – 2009: Post-Apartheid South African Intelligence (NIA, SASS, NCC, NICOC)
Statutory and non-statutory intelligence structures amalgamated into newly formed
structures integrating the NIS, the ANC-DIS, the Transkei Intelligence, the
Bophuthatswana Internal Intelligence Service, the Venda National Intelligence
Service and the PAC-PASS32 with Joe Nhlanhla as Deputy Minister of Intelligence
within the Justice Ministry (Dullah Omar as Minister) into the following structures:
the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) was established with a domestic security
intelligence focus and a service responsible for a foreign intelligence focus; the South
African Secret Service (SASS) and a technical capability within the National
Communication Centre (NCC) as mandated by relevant legislation. Several policy
changes and subsequent restructurings followed which included the creation of a
Ministry of Intelligence in 1999 as well as the establishment of an Academy for
Intelligence. Change was inevitable and another amalgamation process started in
2009.

South Africa. History. South African Government Information. (South African Government
Online, 2012), available at: http://www.info.gov.za
27 Africa, Policy for Managing Access to Intelligence Information, 83.
28 Ibid, 91.
29 O’Brien, The South African Intelligence Services, 177.
30 Africa, Changing Intelligence Dynamics, 70-71.
31 With the election, Nelson Mandela became President and De Klerk a vice-president. the ANC
emerged from the election with a 62% majority. The main opposition came from the NP, which gained
20% of the vote. The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) received 10% of the vote. The NP withdrew from
the Government in 1996.
32 O’Brien, The South African Intelligence Services, 207 – 208.
26
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2009 – 2015: The SSA
Jacob Zuma was inaugurated as President of South Africa after the fourth democratic
elections on May ninth 2009 and shortly thereafter announced several changes to
current government departments.33 These included a review of the structures of the
civilian intelligence community and the subsequent creation of the State Security
Agency (SSA)34 through a Presidential Proclamation. A phased approach was
followed to bring together the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the South
African Secret Service (SASS), the South African National Academy of Intelligence
(SANAI), the Electronic Communications Security (Pty) Ltd (ESC) and the Office of
Interception Centres (OIC). The creation of a Deputy-minister for State Security
followed in 2014. As explained, the civilian intelligence service of South African – the
SSA – has its roots deeply embedded within its origins within a police intelligence
structure.
This nevertheless, brings the position of intelligence education and training to the
fore.
Early Developments in Intelligence Education and Training
The need for improving the military knowledge and qualifying military leaders for
their task in South Africa was realised at the very outset. Thus it was that the Dutch
East India Company that decided in 1786 to establish a training centre in South
Africa for military cadets, selected from the local population with an instruction to
Governor van der Graaff to establish a Militaire Kweckschool. However, the school
did not reach the stage where it functioned properly nor focussed on any intelligence
related training, and closed soon afterwards.35 The next moves towards the
establishment of a military college in South Africa were taken after the Union in 1910
when the S.A. Military School was established on 1 July 1912 at the Old Presidency in
Bloemfontein. This was not a military college in the true sense as those of Woolwich
and Sandhurst in England, West Point in America, Kingston in Canada and Canberra
in Australia. Nevertheless, following the outbreak of the First World War, the
establishment was closed to be re-established in 1920 in the now familiar stone
building at Roberts Heights (or more commonly known as Voortrekkerhoogte in
Pretoria) and designated the South African Military School.
Initial intelligence training in the early years of statutory intelligence, when South
Africa was a dominion of the British Empire, took place under the auspices of the
British Military Intelligence structures. This situation continued from 1910 up to the
declaration of South Africa as an independent republic in 1961. The then Military
South African Yearbook, 2011/12.
South Africa. Amendments of Schedules 1 and 3 to the Public Services Act, 1994 (Act No. 103 of
1994), (Proclamation no R 59 of 2009) Government Gazette, 531:5, 11 Sept. 2009 (Regulation
Gazette no. 32566), It provided for the following structure: the former National Intelligence Agency
(NIA), which is now the Domestic Branch of the State Security Agency; the former South African
Secret Service (SASS), which is now the Foreign Branch; the former South African National Academy
of Intelligence (SANAI), which is now the Intelligence Academy; and the National Communications
which comprises of the Communications Centre (NCC), Office for Interception Centres (OIC) and
Electronic Communications Security (Pty) Ltd (COMSEC).
35 Gomm, Neville, “The South African Army College,” Military History Journal vol 2 no 3 (June
1972): 1.
33

34
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Intelligence within the former South African Defence Force (SADF) took command
and control of intelligence education and training. With the establishment of the
Division Military Intelligence (1961) several officers were sent on course to Britain,
France, Germany and the USA.36 During 1975 the DMI was deployed to the Radcliff
Observatory at Fort Klapperkop – Pretoria where the Military Intelligence College
was also established to conduct intelligence training. In 1980 the Army established a
specific intelligence corps and subsequently an intelligence school in Kimberly in the
same base as the Danie Theron Combat School (established in 1968) and eleventh
Commando (established in 1973) as the training wing that was disbanded in 1982.
The same year the SA Intelligence School was established and provided training in
collection, security, communications and counterintelligence to military personnel.
In the 1990’s the Intelligence School moved to its current base in Potchefstroom.
Intelligence training within the South African Police Services received much less
attention in comparison to practices within the military environment. Although the
first established statutory intelligence service in South Africa saw the light within the
then detective branch of the police, very limited information is available regarding
intelligence related training. This also seems to be the case within the later
established Special Branch except for counter subversion training received from the
British MI5. However, the focus of the police services in South Africa is currently
more towards crime prevention and the practice of crime intelligence, for that
purpose. To this extent the South African Police Services has a Crime Intelligence
Academy in Pretoria to provide training for members working within that
environment.
However, the civilian intelligence in South Africa was initially slow in establishing
their own intelligence training structures. It seems that apart from intelligence
training received abroad, the BOSS mainly employed experienced military and police
officers within their ranks and did not have a specific dedicated intelligence training
unit. This was to change with the establishment of the NIS in the eighties and the
subsequent inauguration of an Intelligence Academy situated outside of Pretoria,
called the Farm. Intelligence training was however restricted to members within the
NIS with the focus on intelligence tradecraft. As also described by Mc Carthy, 37 the
initial practice within the former NIS was to recruit graduates from various
universities within South Africa. He also argues that the initial focus within the
civilian intelligence was on intelligence collection and investigations with a lesser or
limited focus on academic insight or scientific analysis.
After the first democratic elections in 1994, the internal service NIA and the external
service, the South African Secret Service (SASS), initially received intelligence
training from the Intelligence Academy until restructuring in 2003 with the
inauguration of SANAI, as an independent training institute directly under the
Intelligence Ministry. The South African education environment also changed with
the introduction of a National Qualification Framework (NQF)38 similar to other
countries in the world. The Department of Basic Education (DBE) was formed when
Wall, D, “Introduction to Military Intelligence” available at:
sadf.info/MiliaryIntelligenceIntroduction.html
37 Mc Carthy, Shaun, “The Relationship Between Academic and Intelligence Communities in PostApartheid South Africa,” (South African Defence Review Issue no 13, 1993), available at:
https://www.issafrica.org/pubs/asr/SADR13/McCarthy.htm
38 South Africa. National Qualifications Framework (NQF). (2015), available at : www.saqa.org.za/
36
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the then National Department of Education was split into two: DBE and the
Department of Higher Education and Training.39 DBE has been tasked with
overseeing primary and secondary education in South Africa. The South African
Qualification Authority (SAQA)40 was established to oversee the development and
implementation of NQF. This brings the current intelligence training and education
practices in South Africa to the fore.
Intelligence Training and Education within South Africa: Current
Practices
The introduction of the NQF as a single integrated system comprised of three
qualification
sub-frameworks: General Further Education and Training (UMALUSI),41 the Council
for Higher Education (CHE)42 and the Quality Council for Trades and Occupations
(QCTO).43 The NQF consists of ten levels which is divided into three bands; Levels 1
to 4 equate to high school grades nine to twelve or vocational training, five to seven
are college diplomas and technical qualifications, seven to ten are university degrees.
This could be delineated as follows:
Sub Framework

NQF Level

Umalusi

Levels one-four (ABET and Pre-school,
Primary School, Secondary School - Grade 1
– 12 )

Council
(CHE)

for

Higher

Education

Levels six-ten (Higher diplomas, First
degrees, Honours, Masters and PhD
Universities)

Quality Council for Trades and
Occupations

Levels one-eight (Certificates, Occupational
Certificates and Diplomas Colleges)

The challenge within this system is to be able to provide intelligence education, apart
from the existing intelligence training. The latter is currently restricted to the
SAQA/NQF level four-dix with statutory qualifications ranging from certificates,
national certificates to diplomas for members of the intelligence community (military
intelligence, crime intelligence and civilian intelligence). These qualifications, as
registered within the SAQA, are only provided on a limited scale by entities within
the intelligence community with the focus on skills training rather than intelligence
education. The current status of intelligence education is even not enhanced with the
South Africa. Department of Basic Education and Departement of Basic Education and Department
of Higher Education and Training (2015), available at:
http://www.education.gov.za/TheDBE/AboutDBE/tabid/435/Default.aspx
40 South Africa. South African Qualification Authority (SAQA). (2015), available at:
http://www.saqa.org.za/show.php?id=5661#sthash.rMKf2IE8.dpuf
41 South Africa. General Further Education and Training (Umalusi). (2015), available at:
http://www.umalusi.org.za Umalusi takes care of one of the nation`s most treasured assets - the
standards of general and further education and training, hence its name, which means `herder` or
`shepherd` - in Nguni culture the person who is the guardian of the family`s wealth.
42 South Africa. Council for Higher Education (CHE). (2015), available at: http://www.che.ac.za/
43 South Africa. Quality Council for Trades and Occupations. (QCTO). (2015), available at:
http://www.qcto.org.za/
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recent establishment of the opening of the Police University in Paarl – Western Cape,
which in partnership with the University of South Africa, presents a Bachelor of
Police degree to members of the SAPS. To this extent their curriculum does not make
any provision for intelligence studies – albeit crime intelligence education.
Similarly, the curriculum of the Bachelor degree in Military Science offered by the
Military Academy44 (established in 1950) at Saldana Bay, also does not accommodate
for any intelligence subjects. The only university to present the subject intelligence
within an existing degree was the former Rand Afrikaans University (RAU) during
the early nineties as part of a Honours degree in National Strategy. Limited attention
was also given to intelligence as part of curriculum models in security studies
presented by UNISA and UP. The unfortunate situation in South Africa is that no
tertiary institutions, including private institutions, currently caters to or presents
intelligence studies as a subject or degree. This is apparent even in light of different
cooperation agreements between the intelligence and tertiary institutions. The only
options available to practitioners of intelligence to further their academic
qualifications are to study intelligence at the post-graduate level within a masters or
PhD programme within Political Science, International Relations or Security Studies.
This situation is mainly due to a gap in direct relations between intelligence agencies
in South Africa and academic institutions – as is the practice in the USA, UK,
Australia, Canada and other countries in the EU. The reason for this could be
ascribed to an over-emphasis on secrecy and the need to know principle on the one
hand, and the lack of understanding of the true value of intelligence education to the
intelligence practitioners, on the other.
Furthermore, to the nexus between intelligence training and intelligence education is
the prevailing thinking (as evident in the history and development of South African
Intelligence), that the training of officers in in-house intelligence skills programmes
is preferred above the recruiting of potential candidates who obtained professional
qualifications through intelligence education programmes. On a lighter note, it
seems that this is mainly due to the notion that intelligence officers, by nature, resist
any theory. In addition, the practice of recruiting members with existing
qualifications ranging from the Social Sciences (law, humanities and political
science) and Natural Sciences (engineering and technical), vis-a-vis recruiting
members with professional qualifications in Intelligence Studies (which is nonexisting), also contributes to the slow pace of developing intelligence education in
South Africa.
Conclusion
In summary, it seems that the situation is no different in other countries within the
rest of the continent, even despite efforts by the African Union to address intelligence
education. These efforts include intelligence training initiatives planned by the
Committee of Intelligence and Security Services in Africa (CISSA), which was
established in 2004 by Security Heads of African countries to address security
challenges on the continent, as well as an attempt by Southern African Development
Countries (SADC) to provide intelligence training amongst each other.
The Military Academy was initially established in partnership with the University of Pretoria and
currently with the University of Stellenbosch. The Military Academy also presents post graduate
degrees on masters and Ph D levels.
44
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The only exception to the lack of formal intelligence education programmes is the
Robert Gabriel Mugabe School for Intelligence (RGMSI) in Zimbabwe which
presents a two-year diploma and four-year degree to intelligence and security officers
in association with the Bindura University. The specific content and curriculum of
these programmes, however, is not widely known, as well as its impact and
contribution, towards the development of intelligence education. The nexus between
intelligence training and intelligence education is apparent on the continent.
Given the fact that South Africa, Southern Africa and the rest of the continent
experience a gap in intelligence education, this situation offers various opportunities
for the development of applicable intelligence education programmes through the
establishment of partnerships between intelligence agencies and relevant tertiary
institutions. This would not only contribute to the enhancement of current skills and
education of intelligence practitioners, but would also contribute to the improvement
of intelligence practices in addressing security and intelligence challenges on the
continent. Such efforts could also contribute to the theory and development of
Intelligence Studies as an academic sub-discipline, thereby addressing the nexus
between intelligence training and education.
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